With a view to better assessment of the roles played by social security and social policy in determining well-being, this article introduces the "decommodified security ratio" (DSR), an instrument for evaluating an important duty of the social State, namely to maintain and improve people's economic security. To that end we describe the conventions for its use, analyse its main components in 20 European countries in 2002 and simulate the changes in it produced by ten variations in those components. From an analysis of the sensitivities of economic security we then demonstrate three different rationales.
son's place of res i dence or sit u a tion of in ad e quate means. 1 Decommodified se cu rity thus en com passes both so cial se cu rity per se and se cu rity in the form of ben efits, as sis tance and so cial wel fare de liv ered to the needy by local gov ern ment and wel fare or ga ni za tions. 2 To para phrase word ing used in the sub stan tial work L'Etat so cial by Merrien et al. (2004) , "the em blem atic face of the so cial State" con sists of the full range of so cial entitlements, the guar an tee of these which state back ing pro vides, and the ac tions which the State takes in the name of na tional sol idar ity. Thus, the pres ent ar ti cle takes as its start ing point the links be tween eco nomic se cu rity and de vel op ment of the role of the so cial State, in pro posing a tool for eval u at ing eco nomic se cu rity as pro vided by so cial pro tec tion sys tems. This tool is the "decommodified se cu rity ra tio". Af ter a brief histor i cal re view of the in ter ac tion be tween so cial State and mar ket forces, we pres ent three in di ca tors which seek to mea sure eco nomic se cu rity and the "decommodification" of peo ple's entitlements: Esping-Andersen's score, a Ca na dian in dex of se cu rity and the "decommodified se cu rity ra tio". Features of this third in di ca tor are il lus trated in Ta ble 1, which shows the compo nents of se cu rity for a range of Eu ro pean so cial States. An es ti mate is then made of the mul ti ple ways in which the decommodified se cu rity ra tio is sen si tive to so cial pol icy.
Social construction of economic security and principles for assessing it
Now a days, in most Eu ro pean coun tries, most of the pop u la tion is pro tected against the risk of pov erty. But be cause this eco nomic se cu rity is rel a tive, not to tal, it needs to be as sessed. This sit u a tion is the re sult of a lengthy process of so cial con struc tion. The his tory of suc ces sive ini tia tives by the so cial State can be traced through the man i fes ta tions of ma te rial se cu rity en joyed by the pub lic, or rather their lack of it (Castel, 2003) . Thus, if we look back to the sev en teenth cen tury and Hobbes' Le vi a than of 1651, a sem i nal work by one of the ear li est think ers of the mod ern age, in na ture "Man is a wolf to Man" and there is no se cu rity at all. Ac cord ing to Hobbes, in or der to pro -1. We dis re gard in this arti cle eco nomic secu rity which pro tects against cer tain risks as mentioned by Beck (1986) in his Risikogesellschaft and related to nat u ral or indus trial disas ters or the even tu al ity of ter ror ist attack, civil dis tur bance, crime or war, risks which fall within the province of civil soci ety.
2. Refer ring to the def i ni tion of social pro tec tion pro posed by Polanyi (1944) which rec og nizes three main meth ods of attri bu tion (pri vate insur ance, fam ily sol i dar ity, and state and social redis tri bu tion) as a way of pro tect ing work ers against the effects of mar ket forces, we should point out that our approach of decommodified secu rity con cerns only the third method of social pro tec tion as defined by this author. tect one self against this ab sence of se cu rity, born nec es sar ily of hu man beings liv ing to gether in so ci ety, it was nec es sary to de velop a strong State which would con fer pro tec tion and guar an tee se cu rity. The same view was voiced at the same time by Locke (1690) who held that the prime duty of the lib eral State was to pro tect prop erty, which pro vided se cu rity for the individ ual. Castel (2003) says à propos of this that, prior to Saint Just and Robespierre, pri vate prop erty was the cor ner stone of se cu rity for the cit izenry, to be de fended by the Re pub lic they were build ing. This ini tial feature of con sti tu tional States, whereby se cu rity was tied to prop erty, per sists to day in the struc ture of most in dus tri al ized States' leg is la tion, though the eco nomic bases which made this nec es sary are no lon ger as pow er ful.
The State as guarantor of means and decommodified security
In the course of the past two cen tu ries, this duty of the so cial State as a guaran tor of se cu rity broadly evolved as a coun ter weight to pres sures which threaten the struc ture of the mar ket, even though the ad vent of wage employ ment rad i cally al tered the bases of se cu rity by ru in ing a large pro portion of small com mer cial busi nesses in the in dus tri al ized world. As so cial ad vances added guar an tees against the risks of oc cu pa tional ac ci dent, then oc cu pa tional dis ease, re tire ment and un em ploy ment, the sta tus of the employee came to be as so ci ated with more and more types of se cu rity. Thus, in Bis marck's Ger many, and then in France and the United King dom, the ear li est so cial pro tec tion in sti tu tions grad u ally con sol i dated these par tial se cu ri ties, com bin ing them into so cial se cu rity entitlements un der writ ten by the State and then es tab lish ing "em ploy ment" as a rec og nized sta tus in law. When co ali tions came to power, un der pinned by the trade un ions in so cial dem o cratic gov ern ments in north ern Eu rope, fea tures of a wagebased so ci ety evolved in which the sta tus of em ploy ment con ferred life long se cu ri ties. While in re cent de cades the de reg u la tion of money mar kets and more frag ile terms of em ploy ment have placed many of the safe guards associated with paid em ploy ment in jeop ardy, nev er the less the so cial State con tin ues to pro vide most of the so cial guar an tees for peo ple in the de veloped coun tries. Vi tal among the forms of pro tec tion which the so cial State has a duty to guar an tee is eco nomic se cu rity, which pro tects against the risk of an in ad e quate in come. One of the prime in se cu ri ties which peo ple ex pe ri ence stems from vari ations in their in come and other fi nan cial means. The in sta bil ity of com mercial ac tiv i ties and the re sources they gen er ate, plus the ran dom events of everyday liv ing, fre quently en dan ger peo ple's abil ity to feed, house and clothe them selves rou tinely and to meet their fun da men tal needs. In or der to es cape the risks of pov erty, they must be pro tected by so cial se cu rity systems and guar an tees of as sis tance from the State. These are all the more valu able in that they are un con di tional and not de pend ent on the whims of the mar ket or the eco nomic cli mate. To this ex tent they are "decom modified"-to bor row the idea of Polanyi (1944) as de vel oped and adapted to the new fea tures of the so cial State in the writings of the Swedish sociologist Esping-Andersen (1990) .
This au thor, seek ing in his book The three worlds of wel fare cap i tal ism to clas sify and in ter pret the pro fu sion of so cial pro tec tion sys tems, cen tred his ana lysis of mod ern States on the con cept of "decommodification". He defined this idea as fol lows: "Decommodification oc curs when a ser vice is ren dered as a mat ter of right and when a per son can main tain a live li hood with out re li ance on the mar ket" (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 22 ). This in depend ence clearly dis tin guishes means which are "decommodified" in this way from the gen eral case of sub jec tion to mar ket forces, which he described as fol lows: "When, how ever, la bor power also be came a com modity, peo ple's rights to sur vive out side the mar ket are at stake. It is this which con sti tutes the sin gle most conflictual is sue in so cial pol icy . . . Wel fare, if not sur vival, came to de pend on the will ing ness of some one to hire one's la bor power" (pp. 35-36) . The main thing here is to stress how this con cept cre ates a clear dis tinc tion be tween commodified se cu ri ties, ruled by the vicissitudes of the mar ket and em ploy ers' de ci sions, and decommodified se cu ri ties which, for their part, are con trolled by the State and the pub lic authorities. Look ing at the work of Orloff (1993) and Lewis (1992) which examines how far decommodification changes gen der re la tion ships, we see that decommodified se cu ri ties are also "fam ily-neu tral" and en able women to be less de pend ent on sup port from their fam i lies or part ners, ow ing to the ex is tence of sep a rate ac counts and individ ual entitlements for women. This ana lysis could be made more com plex still if we in tro duced other so cial play ers, as Merrien et al. (2004, chap. 4, pp. 37-43) en cour age us to do. The lat ter makes one won der if "decommodified" means and se cu rity are not be com ing so cial com mod i ties ap pro pri ated by the State, trade un ions and employers' organizations as part of social compromises closely dictated by the history and specific situations of each country.
Two evaluations of decommodified security
The de vel op ment of nu mer ous pub lic bod ies help ing to "decommodify" secu rity makes it in creas ingly valu able to have con cepts and sta tis ti cal tools which en able us to as sess the con se quences of so cial pol icy as it af fects peo -In ter na tional So cial Se cu rity Re view, Vol. 60, 4/2007 © 2007 The au thor(s) Jour nal com pi la tion © 2007 In ter na tional So cial Se cu rity As so ci a tion ple's se cu rity or lack of it. To ob tain a more de tailed typology and il lus trate its rel e vance, Esping-Andersen (1990) used a sta tis ti cal tool which he called a "decommodification in dex". This was de vised pri mar ily as part of a the oret i cal ana lysis to dis tin guish clearly be tween three groups of coun tries, and it dem on strated that the typology used for so cial pro tec tion sys tems was sound. Can it be ap plied for pur poses other than those orig i nally intended? It ag gre gates both qual i ta tive and quan ti ta tive vari ables for "sets of di men sions" which are very dif fer ent and per tain to three very dif fer ent areas. 3 But as we do not know the con ven tions used to cal cu late the three scores of which the in dex is the mean, we can not re pro duce it and test it on other dates or coun tries. Nor, there fore, can it be used to sim u late the ef fects of so cial pol icy changes on peo ple's per cep tions of their se cu rity or wellbeing. An other at tempt orig i nated in the work of two Ca na dian re search workers who de vised an "in dex of eco nomic well-be ing", which es sen tially seeks to show that per ca pita GDP is a not a good in di ca tor of eco nomic wellbe ing (Osberg and Sharpe, 2002) . The prin ci ple is to take the av er age of four sum mary in di ca tors: the first mea sures con sump tion flows in the broad sense; the sec ond com bines con sid er ations of eco nomic and hu man "wealth stocks" and tries to take ac count of en vi ron men tal dam age; the third combines sum mary in di ca tors of in equal i ties with in di ces of rel a tive eco nomic pov erty; the fourth eval u ates four types of eco nomic in se cu rity re lated to job loss and un em ploy ment, ill ness, old age and fam ily break-up.
To mea sure in se cu rity these au thors chose to eval u ate in di vid u als' subjec tive risk of anx i ety as a re sult of four sit u a tions whose av er age cost to the individ uals con cerned was roughly cal cu la ble. This re quired them to formu late a num ber of ap prox i ma tions and an eco nomic hy poth e sis which they ex pressed as fol lows: "changes in the sub jec tive level of anx i ety about a lack of eco nomic safety are pro por tion ate to changes in ob jec tive risk" (Osberg and Sharpe, 2002, p. 306) . The cost of sick ness was es ti mated solely as the share of un in sured pri vate med i cal care ex penses (which dis re gards loss of earn ings due to time off work); the cost of loss of earn ings was cal culated from the gross re place ment rate for un em ployed work ers; and the cost of di vorce and old age from the mean pov erty rate for lone moth ers and older peo ple (pp. 306-308). These cal cu la tions have the ad van tage that they pro duce re al is tic es ti mates of the scale of the in se cu ri ties as so ci ated with four types of eco nomic risk. With ad di tional ap prox i ma tions, 4 it is thus possi ble to model the vari a tions in in di vid u als' economic security, something which could not be done with the use of Esping-Andersen's decommodification index.
But the as sess ments of in se cu rity ob tained in this way pro vide only very par tial ap prox i ma tions of in come loss due to sick ness, un em ploy ment, divorce or re tire ment. As a re sult, only vari a tions in in se cu rity over time can be eval u ated in each coun try. So we can not com pare re spec tive lev els of eco nomic se cu rity in dif fer ent coun tries of the West. Fur ther more, any analysis of in se cu rity is very prob lem atic be cause one can not val idly com pare the risk from un em ploy ment to the risk caused by sick ness, di vorce or old age. Once again, this other in di ca tor can not be used to simulate the pros and cons of variations in social policy.
Principles and conventions underlying the "decommodified security ratio"
Start ing from a di rectly eco nomic and global ap proach, our in ten tion was to over come the lim i ta tions of ear lier in di ca tors in or der (1) to be able to com pare the rel a tive per for mances of the var i ous so cial States in coun ter ing eco nomic in se cu rity in their pop u la tions, (2) to ana lyse the part played by the dif fer ent risk fac tors, and (3) to simulate the ef fects of dif fer ent so cial pol i cies on se cu rity. As pointed out by Gadrey and Jany-Catrice (2003, p. 73) at the end of an ar ti cle re view ing al ter na tive in di ces of de vel op ment and social prog ress, "it is hard to see how one can do with out 'ques tion able conven tions' when deal ing with the en vi ron ment, qual ity of life and so cial progress, and thus with value sys tems. Even 'se ri ous' eco nomic in di ca tors are full of ques tion able con ven tions, as wit ness the dis cus sion on the ma jor un cer tain ties con cern ing com par i sons of per ca pita GDP in Eu rope." Thus, Esping-Andersen (1990) pre ferred an in sti tu tional ap proach in as sess ing what he called "the decommodifying po ten tial of so cial pol i cies". 5 We, how ever, opted for a more individ ually based ap proach to peo ple's se cu - The decommodified se cu rity ra tio: A tool for as sess ing Eu ro pean so cial pro tec tion sys tems 76 4. These approx i ma tions, which are not described at length in the arti cle in ques tion, sug gest that the prob a bil ity of the total inse cu rity risk equals the sum of the prob a bil i ties of the four risks taken into account. To accept this one must assume that the vari a tions in the par tial proba bil i ties are addi tive (neg a tive for inse cu rity and pos i tive for secu rity) and there fore that (1) their impor tance is mar ginal and (2) they are inde pend ent of each other.
5.
Namely "the rules that gov ern peo ple's access to ben efits: eli gi bil ity rules and restric tions on entitlements": p. 47. rity, as sess ing lev els of means and, in par tic u lar, es ti mat ing the level at which eco nomic in se cu rity be gins. It goes with out say ing that these two differ ent ap proaches pro duced two dif fer ent types of in di ca tors. The con ventions we adopted (see Menahem and Cherilova, 2005) need to be de scribed in de tail be cause they are ma te rial to our en tire ar gu ment. They are listed be low and re flect three main prin ci ples.
Rel e vant means. We decided to esti mate, as means con trib ut ing to an eco nomic secu rity inde pend ent of links to an employer, decommodified income which derives from social pro tec tion or pub lic assis tance schemes and which peo ple receive at dif fer ent stages in their adult life. Infor ma tion of this kind enables us to assess what pro por tion of individ uals do not have an income ad equate to pro vide them with numer ous forms of secu rity which are of prime impor tance, such as the abil ity to feed, house or clothe themselves. There are three types of such income: • re place ment in come for the risks of old age, un em ploy ment, sick ness and dis abil ity plus sur vi vors' pensions; • re im burse ments and ben efits in kind: costs of healthcare, fam ily al lowances, hous ing ben efits; • al low ances and ben efits in kind paid as part of mea sures to com bat so cial ex clu sion (in come sup port, etc.).
Basis of comparison.
For each coun try or ter ri tory we assessed the level of means which con trib ute towards secu rity, mea sured against the mean dispos able income of per sons in employ ment at the loca tion in ques tion. This quint es sen tial prin ci ple is based on the hypoth e sis that per sons liv ing in a ter ri tory mea sure their stan dard of liv ing against that of per sons deemed in the insti tu tional and media ref er ence sys tem to be "stan dard" individ uals, namely those liv ing in the same social envi ron ment and with a job (we approx i mate this ref er ence as the mean dis pos able income of per sons in employ ment, spe cif i cally their income net of taxes and con tri bu tions, and inclu sive of fam ily, hous ing and sick ness ben efits). The result ing "gross ratio of decommodified eco nomic secu ri ties" is the ratio of total decom modified income to the reference income for the territory in question.
Penalization of eco nomic inse cu rity.
In order to take account of the first type of eco nomic inse cu rity, that of per sons in pov erty due to insuf fi cient income, we took the view that the eco nomic secu rity of house holds whose per capita means are below the pov erty thresh old for the ter ri tory under con sid er ation is zero and that their sit u a tion is penal ized by an inse cu rity equal to the dif fer ence between their income and the ref er ence income.
In prac tice, the index gives a neg a tive weight to peo ple below the pov erty line by attrib ut ing to them a neg a tive income of 60 per cent of the mean dispos able income of per sons in employ ment. 6 This strong penal iza tion is designed to take account of the posi tion of needy groups whose eco nomic inse cu rity dimin ishes their chances of well-being and sur vival. It also raises ques tions about the capac ity of the insti tu tions whose duty it is to pro vide individ uals with a secu rity inde pend ent of mar ket vicis si tudes. Glob ally, then, it has to be sub tracted from the decommodified secu rity provided by the various institutions making up the social State. This lat ter prin ci ple points up the im por tance we were anx ious to give to the ob jec tive of so cial co he sion, in our view a ma jor fac tor in the se cu rity of a pop u la tion liv ing in a given ter ri tory. All in all, the decommodified (eco nomic) se cu rity ra tio (DSR) is both a sum mary and a rel a tive in di ca tor. Summary be cause it com bines a gross ra tio for the level of decommodified means and the level of rel a tive pov erty. Rel a tive be cause it adds to gether the in come from so cial entitlements which individ uals re ceive through out their adult life in the coun try con cerned and di vides them by a de nom i na tor which rep re sents the av er age liv ing stan dard of per sons in em ploy ment, less the rel a tive insecurity experienced by households below the poverty line.
For mu lae for cal cu lat ing the DSR. These meth od olog i cal con sid er ations all trans late into account ing for mu lae for cal cu lat ing and com par ing the decommodified secu rity lev els of dif fer ent pop u la tions. They can be presented in two dif fer ently aggre gated forms. First, at a highly macro economic level, if DSR is the decommodified secu rity ratio and EII is the eco nomic inse cu rity index for per sons in house holds liv ing below the pov erty thresh old, we have: The decommodified se cu rity ra tio: A tool for as sess ing Eu ro pean so cial pro tec tion sys tems 78 6. This assess ment of eco nomic inse cu rity is close to the pov erty thresh old, namely Eurostat's def i ni tion of "60 per cent of the national median equivalized dis pos able income after social trans fers", hence the adop tion of this weight ing which pro vides a sys tem of penal iza tion consis tent with the ref er ence income used in the denom i na tor. One notes also that the dis con ti nuity of the curve for decommodified eco nomic secu rity as deter mined by peo ple's incomes is atten u ated by the exis tence of a sig nif i cant pro por tion of per sons whose income is close to the pov erty line. Given that eco nomic secu rity is eval u ated in terms of the dif fer ence between their income and 0.6 x the ref er ence income, the curve first drops to zero when income reaches the pov erty thresh old, then falls slowly to its low est value, -0.6 x the ref er ence income, when income decreases fur ther.
A sec ond for mula pro duced by a par tially disaggregated ap proach can also be put for ward. The adult pop u la tion can be di vided into three categories ac cord ing to the type of decommodified in come which they re ceive: individ uals who re ceive re place ment in comes (un em ploy ment or dis abil ity ben efit, re tire ment or sur vi vors' pen sions); those who re ceive re im bursements and ben efits in kind for their healthcare costs, or hous ing ben efits; and those who re ceive ben efits and al low ances paid as part of mea sures to com bat ex clu sion (so cial min ima such as in come sup port, ba sic old age pension and other forms of "sol i dar ity" pay ment).
It is worth point ing out that there may be sig nif i cant over lap be tween the four pop u la tions ar ti fi cially picked out here: for ex am ple, some un employed or re tired per sons cat e go rized as poor may be in re ceipt of a pen sion or un em ploy ment ben efit while at the same time re ceiv ing re im burse ment of healthcare costs or hous ing ben efits and, if their in come is too low to raise them out of the pov erty bracket, they may be pe nal ized in DSR terms because the last line of the for mula is neg a tive. Know ing that each pop u la tion has to be weighted ac cord ing to its sta tis ti cal size and that we need to add to these di rect decommodified in comes other in di rect in comes re ceived in reim burse ment of healthcare or other costs, we can also use a sec ond for mula, as fol lows: 7 DSR = % re tired, un em ployed, dis abled per sons x mean re place ment in come (pen sion, un em ploy ment) mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment + mean to tal of healthcare re im burse ments and in-kind and hous ing ben efits mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment + % per sons suf fer ing pov erty and ex clu sion
x ben efits and al low ances paid to com bat ex clu sion and ba sic old age pen sion mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment -0.6 x % pop u la tion in pov erty
To check how ac cu rately these the o ret i cal for mu lae can re cord the real dif fer ences in se cu rity be tween coun tries, we used the da ta bases de vised and main tained by Eurostat. In so do ing we took over the cat egories and clas si fi ca tions drawn up by this Eu ro pean or ga ni za tion, par tic u larly regard ing so cial ben efits, which Eurostat breaks down into eight groups under its ESSPROS sys tem. Note: The net DSR of 2.9 per cent for Lithuania is the difference between its low level of security-enhancing resources (13.1 per cent) and its high economic insecurity (-10.2 per cent). I n the United Kingdom, high i nsecurity (-10.8 per cent) is offset by sizeable security-enhancing resources (23.9 per cent), so its DSR is 13.1 per cent, f our times that of Lithuania.
Features of decommodified security in 20 European countries
8. The great advan tage of Eurostat data is that they are pro vided within a con sis tent framework which per mits inter na tional com par i sons. But being sup plied by the var i ous Euro pean member state gov ern ments, they are only made avail able sub ject to spe cific rhythms and constraints. Con se quently our tabulation con tains the dif fer ent vari ables needed to cal cu late the Note: This fig ure shows the pos i tive and neg a tive fac tors which de ter mine decommodified se cu rity. Thus, in Spain in 2002, the DSR is just 4.9 per cent of the mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment, i.e. the sum of se cu ri ties for re tire ment and un em ploy ment (9.2 per cent), sick ness and dis abil ity (6.4 per cent), ben efits to fam i lies and dis ad van taged per sons (0.7 per cent), and less in se cu rity (11.4 per cent). By con trast, in Nor way it is 27.9 per cent of the mean ref er ence in come, or five times higher in that same year (with, re spec tively, se cu ri ties of 10.2 per cent + 17.9 per cent + 5.8 per cent, less insecurity of 6 per cent).
These es ti mates, re pro duced in Fig ure 1 , re veal size able dif fer ences in the se cu rity lev els of Eu ro pean pop u la tions, with four groups of coun tries emerg ing as ho mo ge neous in terms of eco nomic guar an tees. The breakdown of sources of eco nomic se cu rity listed in Ta ble 1 and de picted graph ically in Fig ure 2 gives us a better un der stand ing of the or i gins of these dispar i ties which can be traced back to the in sti tu tional his tory of these countries. Af ter a brief ac count of the lim i ta tions of our es ti mates we then set out to ana lyse our con clu sions.
In terms of decommodified security, European countries in four main groups
The wide di ver sity of out comes of Eu ro pean so cial ben efit sys tems is clearly ap par ent in Fig ure 1 . A his tor i cal di vide can be seen be tween the coun tries of the North, main land Eu rope plus the United King dom, whose so cial protec tion sys tems have made great strides in the past 50 years and more, and the coun tries of the South and the cen tral and east ern Eu ro pean coun tries (CEEC) where sys tems of pro tec tion are still ru di men tary or far more recent. In the for mer main group, decommodified se cu rity ranges from 13 to 28 per cent of the mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment, whereas in the sec ond group it is only 3 to 11 per cent. But the sec ond group is far from ho mo ge neous and three quite dis tinct sub groups can be iden tified within it.
We would point out here that the typology used for the decommodified se cu rity ra tio is largely com pat i ble with that of Esping-Andersen (1990) . The group of the coun tries of the North equates es sen tially to the group of coun tries which Esping-Andersen calls "so cial dem o cratic", and the group of coun tries la belled "in ter me di ate" is very close to his "con ser va tive" group, with two no ta ble ex cep tions out of ten coun tries: It aly is classed as con ser va tive but is not in the "in ter me di ate" group, and the United Kingdom is part of the in ter me di ate group but is classed as "lib eral". 9 Be cause our es ti mates were for Eu ro pean coun tries only and Esping-Andersen did not con sider other coun tries of the South or the CEEC, this com par i son could not be taken fur ther. The decommodified se cu rity ra tio: A tool for as sess ing Eu ro pean so cial pro tec tion sys tems 82 Thus, the five "coun tries of the North" with the high est DSR are part of the same so cial dem o cratic tra di tion of ac tive state mea sures, gen er ous benefits and uni ver sal cov er age, even if they did not re act to the cri sis of the 1990s with the same re forms. 10 Their DSRs re flect the sim i lar i ties of their type of so cial State: in 2002, be tween 22.2 and 27.9 per cent. The group of the "in ter me di ate coun tries" is far more het er o ge neous, how ever, be cause it includes one ad vanced for mer so cial ist coun try (the Czech Re pub lic) and four coun tries which in Esping-Andersen's clas si fi ca tion (1990) are "con ser vative" -Bel gium, Ger many, France and Aus tria -plus a "lib eral" coun try, the United King dom. The scat ter of their DSRs is some what greater, from 13.1 per cent for the United Kingdom to 22 per cent for Austria.
The group of the four "coun tries of the South" ex hib its nu mer ous shared fea tures. Here, poor de vel op ment of the so cial State has long gone hand in hand with tra di tions of crony ism and corporatism, so pro duc ing vary ing kinds of ob sta cles to re form. Thus, Greece, It aly, Spain and Por tu gal each in their own way com bine the de vel op ment of their fi nan cial trans fers on a corporatist ba sis with poorly de vel oped ben efits and ser vices to fam i lies and those in pov erty, and the de vel op ment of fam ily net works to make up for these in ad e qua cies. 11 It is strik ing, over and above this va ri ety, that these four coun tries share a sim i larly low level of decommodified se cu rity: from 4.9 per cent for Spain to 11.1 per cent for Portugal.
Why is the dif fer ence in DSR be tween Spain and Por tu gal so large? This may be ex plained in part by the dif fer ent ways in which the workforce is mo bi lized in the two coun tries: first, the em ploy ment rate is far higher in Por tu gal (49.3 per cent of the to tal pop u la tion in 2002) than it is in Spain (39.4 per cent), while the Por tu guese so cial se cu rity sys tem has a greater capacity to col lect con tri bu tions and pro vide a high level of decommodified ben efits. An other pe cu liar ity is that there are far more women in employment in Por tu gal (46 per cent of the work ing pop u la tion in 2002) than in Spain (40 per cent). These facts dem on strate a greater com mit ment by the so cial State to wards decommodified pro vi sion of care for chil dren and the el derly pop u la tion in Portugal, where there are more working women.
The CEEC group also shows a ho mo ge ne ity born of his tory. The five social States con cerned all emerged from the same so cial ist sys tem, have all from dif fer ing dates on wards be gun the same pro cess of tran si tion to a market econ omy and have joined the Eu ro pean Un ion. Al though their so cial secu rity sys tems were shaped his tor i cally in a man ner spe cific to each of them in di vid u ally, it is re mark able that their DSRs are sim i larly low, rang ing from 2.9 per cent for Lith u a nia to 6.1 per cent for Po land. The low level of DSRs in the CEEC prompts two ques tions: how is it so low when prior to 1989 the so cial ist re gimes in these coun tries pro vided the whole pop u la tion with a min i mum level of se cu rity? And why is the DSR at least 11 per cent higher in the Czech Re pub lic when that coun try has so many his tor i cal char ac ter is tics in com mon with the other CEEC? First, it was only 15 years ago at most that a start was made on trans fer ring the fi nanc ing of pen sions, healthcare and the main so cial ben efits, pre vi ously done by the so cial ist State in the CEEC, to a sys tem based on so cial se cu rity con tri bu tions. And that is a pro cess re quir ing rad i cal re or ga ni za tion which will take a long time. This pro cess of mak ing up ground has been made more dif fi cult by a re sis tance to tax a tion en gen dered by higher con tri bu tions, which place a bur den on em ploy ers and pri vate individ uals, and by the fact that em ployers now no lon ger pro vide a num ber of so cial ben efits. The Czech Re public's better DSR is due in the main to the greater growth in that coun try of "health funds", which fi nance the healthcare system on a decentralized basis, and to more vigorous economic growth since 1994 resulting in better reduction of poverty.
Links between the features of the three main components of decommodified security, and economic insecurity
The struc ture of the DSR is ana lysed nu mer i cally in Ta ble 1 and graph i cally in Fig ure 2 . This ana lysis leads us rap idly to four find ings: the first three con cern decommodified means shown as pos i tive values above the hor izon tal axis and vary ing from 13 to 34 per cent; and the last shows the lev els of eco nomic in se cu rity as neg a tive val ues be low the hor i zon tal axis, from 5 to 13 per cent. tec tion "safety net" are cre at ing high lev els of eco nomic inse cu rity of 10 to 13 per cent. 12
Advantages and limitations of classifications based on decommodified security
We find that the decommodified se cu rity ra tio has three prime ad van tages when we com pare the anal y ses of so cial sys tems based on the DSR with those us ing ei ther Esping-Andersen's decommodificat ion in dex or the secu rity com po nent of Osberg et Sharpe's in dex of eco nomic well-be ing: (1) it per mits com par i sons of the so cial sys tems of dif fer ent coun tries whose levels of de vel op ment may be very un equal;
(2) it helps to ana lyse the ex tent to which var i ous so cial ben efits con trib ute to wards the eco nomic se cu rity of a coun try's na tion als, both one ben efit com pared with an other and all benefits to gether; and (3) it en ables us to sim u late the ef fects of vari a tions in eco nomic and so cial pol icy. But these prac ti cal ad van tages have to be weighed against the DSR's considerable limitations. Ini tial un cer tain ties in the ta bles and fig ures re flect the in ad e qua cies of the Eurostat data when it co mes to as sess ing decommodified in come. Specifically, the global na ture of the eight so cial pro tec tion func tions in the ESSPROS clas si fi ca tion means that some cash ben efits or ben efits in kind asso ci ated with the func tions "un em ploy ment", "sur vi vors" and "old age" are cat e go rized as re place ment in come and not as ben efits. More over, the Eurostat clas si fi ca tion ag gre gates all in come which goes into the for ma tion of re tire ment pen sions, re gard less of whether the schemes con cerned are pay-as-you-go or funded schemes, and this in tro duces a mea sure of fuzz iness into intercountry com par i sons of decommodified in come. The global na ture of the "sick ness" and "dis abil ity" func tions in the ESSPROS clas si fica tion also means that this cat egory in cludes re place ment in come cor respond ing to dis abil ity pen sions and the per diem ben efits paid for time off work due to sick ness. This further reduces the accuracy of our breakdowns.
In ad di tion to these fac tors, the ul ti mate im pact of which is yet to be assessed, there are other lim i ta tions which re sult from struc tural dif fer ences in the break down of em ploy ment, re flect ing so ci etal choices in the dif fer ent countries: dif fer ences be tween gen er a tions (young peo ple start ing work rel atively late, older peo ple stop ping work rel a tively early), dif fer ences be - tween men and women and be tween part-and full-time work ing. These three cri te ria are largely in ter de pen dent and sig nif i cantly af fect mean income in a coun try be cause of dif fer ences in pay be tween men and women, young and older peo ple, full-and part-time work ers. For ex am ple, the higher pro por tion of women and older peo ple in em ploy ment in Por tu gal, the United King dom and the coun tries of the North is re flected in two factors which pro duce a higher level of eco nomic se cu rity in these coun tries: a higher over all em ploy ment rate, which means higher to tal con tri bu tions, and lower mean lev els of pay, which means a lower DSR de nom i na tor. 13 More part-time work ing in the Neth er lands, the coun tries of the North and the United King dom has a sim i lar ef fect and helps to push up the figures for economic security in these countries.
In the coun tries of the South such as It aly, Spain and Greece and in the central and eastern Eu ro pean coun tries, more over, a very sig nif i cant phenom e non is that of the pro por tion of un de clared il le gal work ing. This is a sizeable phe nom e non in France too, lead ing to con sid er able un cer tainty about the pro por tion of the pop u la tion ac tu ally in work. This fuzz i ness causes vary ing un der es ti mates of the DSR which are hard to as sess, but it is rea sonable to sup pose that se cu rity will more likely be un der es ti mated in the coun tries of the South than the North.
Un equal rates of main res i dence own er ship, more un equal in the South of Europe than in the United King dom or the coun tries of the North, re late to older peo ple more than to youn ger house holds. These rates thus cause the in comes and ben efits paid to per sons not in work to be un der es ti mated to a greater de gree in the South than in the North, which helps to re duce the DSR more in the South than in the North. Fur ther more, it ought to be pos sible, in more ex ten sive as sess ments of eco nomic in se cu rity, to take ac count of the eco nomic in se cu ri ties as so ci ated with rented ac com mo da tion, tem porary hous ing or home less ness.
More fun da men tally, in de fin ing the DSR, the con ven tions used to es tablish the na ture of the ref er ence in come against which the var i ous decommodified means and eco nomic in se cu rity are mea sured are ex tremely impor tant. They have been par tially jus ti fied above. But they re main ar bi trary and many al ter na tives could use fully be tested: mean in come for all house -holds, or me dian in come, ei ther in con fin ing one self to the em ploy ment com po nent, as in our cal cu la tions, or in con sid er ing all forms of in come. 14 The sim ulations de scribed be low dem on strate the im pli ca tions of these choices.
Main results of DSR simulations for 20 European countries in 2002
Social pol icy ac tors might ask them selves what the ef fects would be on people's se cu rity of in creas ing re tire ment or un em ploy ment ben efits or spending on the re im burse ment of healthcare costs. They might also wish to compare the re sults of this spend ing on se cu rity with the re sult ob tained if incomes are in creased by a spec i fied pay rise to em ploy ees. We sought answers to these ques tions by per form ing ten sim u la tions of the fac tors which de ter mine the DSR.
Method used
In or der to as sess the sen si tiv ity of the DSR to vari a tions in so cial ben efits or pri vate in di vid u als' in comes, we sim u lated a range of al ter na tive so cial policy sce nar ios. We took as our ref er ence sit u a tion the po si tion of the 20 Eu ropean coun tries in 2002, as por trayed in the Eurostat fig ures. By vary ing just one of the ten pa ram e ters mea sured by 1 per cent from the 2002 val ues, it is pos si ble to cal cu late the elas tic i ties 15 of eco nomic se cu rity in re sponse to vari a tions in the ten fac tors (seven dif fer ent so cial ben efits and three types of in come). It should be re mem bered here that in come from paid em ployment, self-em ploy ment and prop erty con sti tutes the three main com ponents of the dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment, and this ref er - The decommodified se cu rity ra tio: A tool for as sess ing Eu ro pean so cial pro tec tion sys tems 88 14. There is not room in this arti cle to explore the var i ous tests which might rem edy these inade qua cies. These could be cov ered in a future pub li ca tion.
15. Elas tic ity is the mea sure of a given object's sen si tiv ity to a force or pres sure. In eco nom ics we talk of the elas tic ity of demand for a good or ser vice depend ing on a range of fac tors (income lev els, prices, etc.). We cal cu late elas tic ity by deter min ing the rela tion ship between rel a tive vari a tions in the vari able under con sid er ation and those in the fac tor we wish to study. To deter mine the elas tic ity of eco nomic secu rity in rela tion to pen sion amount, the for mula is: elas tic ity of eco nomic secu rity = rel a tive vari a tion in eco nomic secu rity / rel a tive vari a tion in pen sion amount. For exam ple, all other things being equal, if a 1 per cent wage increase in Poland pro duces a 1.2 per cent drop in secu rity, the elas tic ity of secu rity in rela tion to income is -1.2. In this case, the per cent age drop in secu rity is greater than the per cent age income increase, and secu rity is deemed to be "income-elas tic". But if a 1 per cent increase in fam ily ben efits pro duces a smaller per cent age increase in secu rity (+0.12 per cent), the elas tic ity of secu rity in rela tion to fam ily ben efits (0.12) is less than unit; secu rity is thus deemed "inelas tic" in respect of this ben efit. ence forms the de nom i na tor against which decommodified means are es timated. 16 Vari a tions in the elas tic ity of se cu rity are the re sponse to two dis tinct effects: one, the di rect ef fect of ben efit sup ple ments which in creases the numer a tor; and two, the in di rect ef fect caused by al ter ing the ref er ence level against which se cu rity is mea sured, which changes both the de nom i na tor and the es ti mated eco nomic in se cu rity level of per sons liv ing be low the pov erty thresh old. Com par i son of these two ef fects will help us to un derstand the vari a tions in the DSR which our so cial pol icy sim u la tions produce.
Analysis of the simulation results
Two gen eral find ings emerge from an ana lysis of the re sults in Ta ble 2. The ta ble's ten col umns show the elas tic i ties of the decommodified se cu rity ratios cal cu lated for a 1 per cent vari a tion in each of the seven main so cial benefits and each of the three main types of di rect in come, each fac tor be ing assumed to vary on its own and with out al ter ing the em ploy ment rate. The 20 Eu ro pean coun tries are ranked in de scend ing or der of their DSR (the 2002 fig ures are given in the sec ond col umn from the left).
Se cu rity gains rise as the DSR falls. Gen er ally speak ing, se cu rity gains measured by elas tic i ties are seen to be greater, the lower the ini tial level of the DSR. This phe nom e non is hugely im por tant bear ing in mind the so cial cohe sion ob jec tives of the Lis bon strat egy adopted by the Eu ro pean Un ion in 2000. We can ver ify it for decommodified ben efits paid only to per sons not in em ploy ment (the ef fects of which op er ate only through changes in the nu mer a tor), for uni ver sal ben efits paid re gard less of whether peo ple are in em ploy ment or not, and for the var i ous forms of commodified in come (the ef fects of which op er ate es sen tially through changes in the denominator).
Vari a tions in elas tic ity are gov erned by three dis tinct mech a nisms. The columns in Ta ble 2 are ar ranged from left to right in de creas ing or der of in depend ence from the mar ket, from pen sions and un em ploy ment ben efits (the ben efits which are the most in de pend ent of em ploy ment in come), through to in come from oc cu pa tional ac tiv ity and prop erty. We shall ob serve this or der in ana lys ing the re spec tive parts which di rect and in di rect fac tors play in vari a tions in eco nomic se cu rity, and we shall see that these fac tors obey three dif fer ent ra tio nales. The decommodified se cu rity ra tio: A tool for as sess ing Eu ro pean so cial pro tec tion sys tems 89 16 . In order to take account of the vari a tions in secu rity cre ated by the tax bur den from tax able income sup ple ments, we endogenized the total amount of tax pay able by assum ing the tax rate to be con stant and equal to that of the ref er ence sit u a tion in the coun try in ques tion in 2002. 
Ben efits paid only to per sons not in employ ment.
Increases in these benefits, which are tar geted at per sons who are not work ing (unem ploy ment and old age), have the great est secu rity-enhanc ing effect, all the more so when these ben efits are expand ing in a coun try where social cov er age is gener ally low (coun tries of the South and the cen tral and east ern Euro pean countries: cf. last 9 rows of Table 2 ). Unem ploy ment and old age ben efits are in fact decommodified ben efits par excel lence in that they are paid only to per sons who are no lon ger part of the workforce and they have no direct impact on the income of per sons in employ ment. Thus, their con tri bu tion to the DSR var ies only with increases in income as rep re sented in the numer a tor. Ben efits paid as part of mea sures to com bat ex clu sion (col umn 3) con tribute to the DSR in the same way, be ing paid only to per sons not in em ployment; so they only have an ef fect through the DSR nu mer a tor. Once again, these are more im por tant in Slovakia and Lith u a nia, coun tries where these ben efits are as yet poorly de vel oped, though the fig ures are lower than for pen sions or un em ploy ment ben efits. Note too that the se cu rity-en hanc ing role of an iden ti cal in crease in ben efits is weighted by the stan dard of liv ing: the lower this is, the more an iden ti cal in crease in in come sup port, for ex ample, will trans late into a greater in crease in se cu rity, and thus into greater elasticity.
To il lus trate these cal cu la tions we have en vis aged ex am ples which are plau si ble un der cur rent so cial con di tions: 2 per cent growth in re tire ment pen sions or 2 per cent growth in un em ploy ment ben efit. In Po land, for exam ple, a 2 per cent in crease in pen sions in 2002 would mean a 2.7 per cent in crease in the DSR. Whereas in Den mark, where the stan dard of liv ing and pen sion lev els are much higher, this same in crease would raise the level of decommodified se cu rity by only 0.8 per cent. If un em ploy ment-re lated pub lic spend ing, al ready high in Den mark (one quar ter of pen sion spending), were to in crease by 2 per cent, the DSR would rise by only 0.18 per cent (again, a quar ter). But in Po land, the en hance ment of decommodified se curity brought about by this same in crease would be only 0.23 per cent, because un em ploy ment ben efits make up a far smaller pro por tion of to tal social benefits in that country.
Ben efits paid regard less of employ ment sta tus.
Sick ness and dis abil ity ben efits (col umns 6 and 7) are uni ver sal ben efits paid both to per sons who are work ing and those out side the labour mar ket. In coun tries where such ben efits are vir tu ally non-exis tent (coun tries of the South and the central and eastern Euro pean coun tries), their secu rity-enhanc ing effect (DSR) is very con sid er able. It is, how ever, less sig nif i cant than that of ben efits paid only to unem ployed per sons. The influ ence of uni ver sal ben efits is dimin - The decommodified se cu rity ra tio: A tool for as sess ing Eu ro pean so cial pro tec tion sys tems 92 ished by the fact that they help to increase the ref er ence income of those in employ ment, the level of which affects both the DSR denom i na tor and the esti mate of eco nomic insecurity. Fam ily and hous ing ben efits (col umns 4 and 5) are paid both to per sons who are work ing and those who are out side the la bour mar ket, but they are of ten means-tested. The ef fect on the DSR of any in crease in these is thus more lim ited be cause the in crease in their con tri bu tion to the nu mer a tor is smaller and is, more over, par tially off set by the fact that these ben efits are added to the in comes of those in em ploy ment, which in creases the ref er ence in come and thus the de nom i na tor too. Be cause these ben efits are cur rently very lim ited in the coun tries of the South and the CEEC, their con tri bu tion to the DSR in these coun tries is greater.
Incomes from eco nomic activ ity and prop erty.
Sup ple ments to wages and sal a ries, how ever, assum ing a con stant num ber of per sons employed and a ris ing stan dard of liv ing for eco nom i cally active per sons, trans late into a reduc tion in decommodified secu rity (DSR). Why is this? Because these increases entail a rise in the ref er ence income, which enables us to mea sure both eco nomic inse cu rity and the decommodified secu rity cre ated by ben efits. When the stan dard of liv ing rises, the decommodified secu rity cre ated by a cer tain level of ben efits rel a tive to the ref er ence income falls. Table 2 shows that the lower the denom i na tors con cerned are, the more this secu rity decreases: and it decreases more in the coun tries of the East or the South than in Scan di na via. A sec ond major effect depends on the numer ator: this is the increase in eco nomic inse cu rity which penal izes decommodified secu rity in pro por tion to the pov erty rate and ref er ence income.
These two fac tors ac count for the neg a tive elas tic i ties for in come from eco nomic ac tiv ity and prop erty (Ta ble 2, last 3 col umns on the right). Income from prop erty (col umn 10) is shared be tween per sons who are econom i cally ac tive and those who are not, and it thus has less of an ef fect on the ref er ence in come; this ex plains why these elas tic i ties are lower than those for self-em ployed in come, though the in comes are com pa ra ble.
In come from paid em ploy ment (col umn 8) ac counts for the larg est share of the ref er ence in come, which is why the elas tic i ties for this are al ways the great est. There is one ex cep tion, Greece, where the pro por tion of in for mal work is very high and re corded in comes from self-em ploy ment ex ceed those from paid em ploy ment. The far smaller elas tic i ties of the northern coun tries com pared with those of the central and eastern Eu ro pean countries, the coun tries of the South or the United King dom are ex plained both by higher in come lev els in those coun tries, which raise the ref er ence standard of liv ing ac cord ingly, and by their lower pov erty rate. Com pared with 
Three rationales determine the sensitivity of security to variations in its components
Three dif fer ent ra tio nales emerge when we com pare the sen si tiv i ties of decommodified se cu rity to the dif fer ent ben efits and in come sources which de ter mine it. The fea tures of the three ra tio nales for these com po nents are illustrated in Ta ble 3, which pro vides a syn op sis of mul ti ple data. 17 It is notable that the elas tic ity ra tio takes just three val ues for each coun try: a max imum score of 1, for the three ben efits paid only to per sons not in em ployment (col umns 1, 2, 3) and whose di rect ef fects are not at ten u ated be cause they do not in flu ence the in come of eco nom i cally ac tive per sons; a score of less than 1 for the four uni ver sal ben efits (col umns 4-7), the ef fect of which on se cu rity is at ten u ated by the fact that they push up the ref er ence in come, both through in se cu rity and the de nom i na tor; and a co ef fi cient greater than 1 for the three in comes which do not con trib ute to decommodified se cu rity (col umns 8, 9, 10) , though in creases in them nev er the less help to lessen the re duc tion which goes with eco nomic in se cu rity (in pro por tion to the income of per sons in em ploy ment) ow ing to di vi sion by the de nom i na tor, all things which help to re duce the DSR. 18 The dif fer ences be tween the decommodified se cu rity scores of the var ious ben efits sug gest that pol i cies di rectly tar geted at per sons not in em ployment con trib ute the most to wards en hanc ing peo ple's se cu rity. This find ing is truer of the coun tries of the North and the in ter me di ate coun tries, as we see from Ta ble 3, which shows that the score for uni ver sal ben efits rises as the DSR falls. In the central and eastern Eu ro pean coun tries, the score of more than 93 per cent for all ben efits shows that all so cial pol i cies con trib ute more or less equally to in creas ing peo ple's se cu rity and im prov ing so cial co he sion, in line with the rec om men da tions of the Lisbon strategy. The decommodified se cu rity ra tio: A tool for as sess ing Eu ro pean so cial pro tec tion sys tems 96 17. To cal cu late the score for ben efits and sen si tiv ity to incomes, we sim ply cal cu late the elastic ity ratio of the DSR and the elas tic ity ratio of the DSR numer a tor, for the ten com po nents of the secu rity-enhanc ing resources. This oper a tion mea sures the total effects of ben efits on decommodified secu rity (both direct and indi rect effects on the ref er ence income against which secu rity and inse cu rity are mea sured) as against the effect on the numer a tor alone. The cal cu la tion stages con cern three terms: the elas tic i ties of decommodified secu rity (Table 2 ) and the elas tic i ties of the DSR numer a tors and denom i na tors (repro duced in the annex, Tables 4  and 5 ).
In ad di tion to dif fer ences be tween coun tries, the con trasts be tween these three ra tio nales point to the im por tance of changes in the ref er ence in comes against which peo ple rate the ben efits they re ceive. The se cu rity gains provided by a given amount of ben efits are all the greater if they re late to mea sures as so ci ated with a more mod est rise in the gen eral level of in comes.
Conclusions
A re view of the ways in which decommodified se cu rity is taken into account in the coun tries of Eu rope shows us that this di men sion is of sig nif icant value to so cial States and can be iden ti fied dif fer ently in four groups of coun tries. Decommodified se cu rity is es pe cially de vel oped in the so cial dem o cratic coun tries of the North, where so cial se cu rity achieve ments have be come more of an es tab lished part of the in sti tu tional fab ric in a man ner largely in de pend ent of the la bour mar ket. This makes the term "decommodified", as ap plied to these forms of se cu rity, all the more ap pro pri ate. An other no ta ble find ing: so cial pol i cies more founded on decommodified se cu rity in the North mean that peo ple are better in te grated by vir tue of their entitlements as cit i zens, and this trans lates into pov erty rates which are lower by half. In the United King dom and Por tu gal, how ever, where secu rity is more "commodified" in the sense that it is more de pend ent on the la bour mar ket, the pro por tion of per sons in pov erty is twice as high as in the coun tries with a so cial dem o cratic tra di tion. Nev er the less, it ap pears that a so cial tra di tion per sists in the old-es tab lished so cial State of the United King dom, where the im por tance of so cial in comes in her ited from the Beveridge Plan keeps the decommodified se cu rity ra tio well above that of It aly. Lastly, we found that the level of decommodified se cu rity in the central and eastern Eu ro pean coun tries is low. All the more rea son to at tach im por tance to tak ing the se cu rity di men sion into ac count when defining the social protection systems which these countries are preparing to develop.
In that con text it may be use ful to draw on our so cial pol icy sim u la tions. These led us to iden tify two types of ben efits: those aimed at per sons not in em ploy ment, and uni ver sal ben efits whose less tar geted ef fects do less to in crease the level of decommodified se cu rity. These two types of ben efits fur ther the con ver gence of so cial sys tems more when they are dis trib uted in the coun tries of the South and the central and eastern Eu ro pean coun tries, whose sys tems are sig nif i cantly less de vel oped than in the so cial States of northern Eu rope. The greater score for ben efits aimed at peo ple not in employ ment, par tic u larly ben efits paid to com bat ex clu sion, thus sug gests which pol i cies would be most likely to im prove so cial co he sion, in line with the ob jec tives of the Lisbon strategy. 
